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COMMENT
CONTRARY TO FIRST IMPRESSION, GENES ARE
PATENTABLE: SHOULD THERE BE LIMITATIONS?
AMANDA S. PITCHER*

I. INTRODUCTION

The Human Genome Project was designed in 1988 to discover the entire
DNA sequence (deoxyribonucleic acid) of the genome.1 The U.S. Government,
which launched the project, expected the project to take 15 years and cost three
billion dollars. The hope is that the discovery of the entire genome will lead to the
development of new methods of medical treatment. The rate of future treatment
development will depend on gene patenting.4 Patents, including gene patents, are
issued by United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Gene patents can
include both the physical aspects of DNA and the methods of using a gene or
protein.5 The USPTO has5 issued several thousand gene patents in recent years. 6
However, because the primary focus has been on the results of the patent, the
process by which the patentability of genes emerged has received less emphasis.
To that end, this comment provides an overview of the patent system and its
underlying policies, and the statutory requirements that must be met for a patent to
issue to a gene sequencer. Following a brief overview of gene isolation, as well as
the legality of gene patenting, its many implications are considered. Because the
benefits arising from gene patents overcome the objections to their patenting,
Congress should impose compulsory licensing on gene patent owners in order to
promote continued research and development.

*J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Maryland School of Law (Baltimore, MD).
1. Byron v. Olsen, The Biotechnology Balancing Act: Patents For Gene Fragments, and
Licensing the "'UsefulArts, "7 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 295, *297 (1997) WL 7 ALBLJST 295.
2. Id.
3. Id.at 3.
4. James Bradshaw, Gene Patent Policy: Does Issuing Gene Patents Accord With The Purposes
of the U.S. PatentSystem?, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 637, *638 (2001) WL 37 WMTLR 637.
5. Id.at *639-40.
6. Id.at *640.
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM

A. Introduction and Procedure
A patent grants the owner exclusive rights over an invention for a period of
twenty years.7 In addition, a patent precludes other people who have subsequently
developed the same technology, any right to use, make or commercialize the
invention.8 In the course of filing a patent application, the inventor must disclose
the invention in exchange for a period of exclusivity over the invention. 9
There are three kinds of patents: utility, design and plant.' 0 Utility patents
can either be product patents, which grant rights over a particular product itself, or
process patents which grant rights on the process of making a product." Design
patents are granted for aesthetic appearance, not for the functional parts of a
product itself or the process by which it is made.' 2 Plants may be protected under a
utility application, but they are also protected under the Plant Patent Act and the
Plant Variety Act.' 3 The remainder of this comment will focus on utility patents.
In order for the USPTO to grant a patent, the patent application must satisfy
the statutory requirements set forth by Congress in 35 U.S.C., also known as the
Patent Act. 14 The congressional requirements include: patentable subject matter,
novelty, utility, enablement and disclosure, and non-obviousness. 15 Moral or
philosophical considerations have no determinative weight in the examination of
6
an application.'
A patent application must traverse several steps before a patent will issue.
First, the applicant (or his attorney) drafts a patent application and files with the

7. See Department of Commerce and USPTO, Manual Of Patent Examining Procedure,§2701
(8th ed. 2001), [hereinafter MPEP]. The term of twenty years starts from the filing date of the patent
application, not the issue date. Id.
8. David B. Resnik, DNA Patents and Human Dignity, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 152, *153 (2001)
WL 29 JLMEDETH 152.
9. See Matthew Erramouspe, Staking Patent Claims on the Human Blueprint: Reward and Rent-

dissipatingRaces, 43 UCLA L. REV. 961, *973-76 (1996) WL 43 UCLALR 961.
10. See generally MPEP, supra note 7, at §§ 1500, 1600.

11. See generally id. An example of a product patent would be a patent on a particular chemical,
whereas a process patent would be on the process for making a particular chemical, not on the chemical
itself.
12. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 333
(2d ed. 2000).
13. Id. at 339. The statutory requirements for plant and design patents differ from those for utility
patents. Id. at 339-42.
14. See generally 35 U.S.C. (2000). Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations also governs
patents. See generally 37 C.F.R (2002).
15. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-3, 112 (2000).

16. Resnik, supra note 8, at *153.
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A patent examiner reviews the application and sends notification as to
whether the invention is patentable.' 8 The applicant (or his attorney) can make
changes to the application in order to overcome the examiners' rejections. The
applicant (or his attorney) cannot add any new material to the application while
modifying it. Decisions of the examiner are reviewable and can be appealled to the
Board of Patent Appeals.' 9 After the Board makes a final rejection of the
application, the applicant can appeal to a federal district court and then to a United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Alternatively, the applicant can
proceed directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and
from there the applicant can appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.2 °
USPTO.'

B. The Policy RationaleBehind Patenting
1. Incentive to Invent (The Reward Theory)
When the Constitution was drafted, the framers wanted to reward inventors
for their efforts at ingenuity. Article I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution states that the
purpose of a patent is to promote progress in science by providing a monopoly
over the invention to the inventor or patent owner. 21 The intention is that the
award of the patent would incentivize inventors to invent.22 Without incentives to
promote innovation, future development would be stagnate. Unchallenged
inventors could become preoccupied with reproducing designs of their counterparts
instead of pushing the scientific envelope further down the road of discovery.23
Furthermore, without a mechanism to protect an invention, capital investment in
research and development is a risky proposition. The monopoly granted by a
patent encourages other inventors to invent around an already patented invention.24
The potential reward of a patent incentivizes people to invest in risky research that
may not otherwise be attempted.25 Without the commercial rewards that result in
the patenting of biotechnology, the technology would not progress as rapidly as it
has.

17. See generallyMPEP, supra note 7.
18. Id.
19. See MPEP, supra note 7, at

§ 1201.

20. Id. at § 1216.
21. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.").
22. Erramouspe, supra note 9, at *973.
23. See id. (explaining central tenet of reward theory).
24. See id. at *976 (explaining consequences of system that only rewards first inventor).
25. Bradshaw, supra note 4, at *653.

2003]

GENES ARE PATENTABLE

2. Incentive to Commercialize
Congress and the Supreme Court "hope" that patents will have a positive
effect on society through the introduction of new products in the market, just as the
framers of the Constitution intended. 6 Patents encourage the commercial
implementation of research, which in turn allows more products to reach the
public. 27 The monopoly a patent grants allows inventors to commercially produce
their products without having to compete, which can have both positive and
28Onhn
negative repercussions. On the negative side, the lack of competitors can inflate
the price of a product because the inventor has sole control of the market. On the
other hand, the elimination of competitors can also allow the inventor to reduce
costs while producing the product.29 Irrespective of the plausible repercussions,
however, another competitor may emerge and create a similar or better product.
Therefore the inventor is encouraged to commercialize quickly or lose his window
of opportunity. Given the fact that numerous inventors are faced with this
challenge of producing quickly, or face rising cost as others enter the market, a
greater selection of products are produced for consumers.

3. The Incentives to Disclose
Although one of the cornerstone purposes of the patent system is to promote
inventiveness, the system also requires the disclosure of the knowledge to the
public. 30 This disclosure of knowledge in turn encourages other inventors to invent3
'
around patented inventions, or to make improvements on an existing invention.
The disclosure of a new invention will also stop the duplicative efforts that may be
in progress.
Before it was envisioned that patents would be applicable to genes or other
medical research, inventors published their inventions as a means to receive
personal recognition as "the first" to invent.3 2 Conversely, in the present patent
system, although there remains the incentive to be "the first" to invent, research
that is ready to be published may not be ready to be patented.33 This motivation

26. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470,480 (1974)).

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See id.
Olsen, supra note 1, at *312.
Bradshaw, supra note 4, at *657.
Id. at *656.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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works against the theory of public disclosure because publication may be delayed
until a patent application is filed.34
Prior to the amendment of 35 U.S.C §122 in 1999, an application was not
published until the patent issued.35 Under current rules, an application is published
18 months after filing the application with USPTO unless the applicant "foregoes"
the opportunity to file in foreign countries. 36 The new rules encourage early
disclosure of an invention, though there remain some situations in which the
USPTO will not publish an application because it pertains to military intelligence
37
or other matters of national security.

C. Statutory Requirements
1. PatentableSubject Matter
Patentable subject matter is the first of the statutory hurdles that need to be
cleared. Patentable subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. §101 as "any new or
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new useful
improvement thereof.- 38 Materials that are naturally occurring or are result from a
natural phenomena cannot be patented because they are never new or novel. 3 9 The
courts have broadly interpreted the statute and have held that materials that are
purified from their natural form may be patented if they also meet the remaining
statutory requirements. 40 The broad interpretation of the statute allows for
bacteria, which are not found in nature, to be patentable, as well as purified
vitamins and genes. 41 To reiterate, the morality of the invention is not assessed
during the review of a patent application. Instead, an application is assessed solely
on whether the invention meets the statutory requirements.42

2. Novelty
In order for an invention to be afforded a patent, it must be novel. The
statutory novelty requirement is set forth in 35 U.S.C. §102. The invention must
not have been available to the public, or used or known to others for more than one

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at *657.
See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (b)(1) (2000); MERGES ETAL., supra note 12, at 321.
MERGES ET AL., supra note 12, at 321.
See MPEP, supra note 7, at § 101.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
Erramouspe, supra note 9, at 968-69.
See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 161 (1958).
See id.
at 164-65; See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
Resnik, supra note 8, at *153.
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year prior to the filing of the patent application.43 Nor, can the essential elements
be contained in a prior invention." In contrast, outside of the U.S. most countries
require absolute novelty for the issuance of a patent.45 This means that the
invention must be kept a complete secret before the application is filed.46 The
United States has relaxed this rule and allows for the information to be disclosed or
known within only the one year prior to the filing of an application.47 The purpose
of the novelty requirement prevents patents on everyday items or processes that are
well known to the public but have never been patented. This requirement also
prevents the duplicity of patents.

3. Utility
In January 2001, the new Utility Examination Guidelines (Guidelines) were
issued by the USPTO.48 The utility standard requires "specific, substantial, and
credible" utility.49 For several years prior to 2001, the court had a relaxed method
of enforcing the utility requirement. 50 In response to the growing number of patent
51
applications for genes and gene segments, the USPTO issued the new Guidelines.
The recent change to a stricter requirement was probably made because the
USPTO realized that by not enforcing the requirement, a patent could be granted
on large unknown areas of scientific knowledge.52
Under 35 U.S.C. §101 the invention must have some practical use or
application.53 Furthermore, the statute does not require that the invention be
superior to an existing invention.54 The Supreme Court has held that a suspected
use is not enough to fulfill the requirement.55 One reasoning behind the utility
requirement is that if the use is unknown the patent may grant rights over a large
unknown area and thereby "block" subsequent research and development. 56 This
would lead to one patent controlling the rights for an entire scientific area, and

43. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
44. Id.
45. MERGES ET AL., supra note 12, at 315.

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
49. Id. at 1093.
50. Sherizaan Minwalla, A Modest Proposal to Amend The Patent Code 35 U.S.C. §287(C) to
Allow Health Care Providers to Examine Their Patients' DNA, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 471, *479-80 (2002)
26 SILULJ 471.
51. See generally Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 48.
52. Minwalla, supra note 50.
53. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
54. Id. .
55. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1996); Minwalla, supra note 50, at *479.
56. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534.
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award a monopoly over an invention that the inventor never had true possession
over.

57

The recent Guidelines will effect many changes, both positive and negative.
The Guidelines added the "substantial" requirement to utility standards, yet fail to
specify what constitutes substantial utility. There is a great likelihood that
inequality may result by imposing the new, stricter requirements without
specifying what substantial utility entails. However, the Guidelines will serve to
combat some of the fears of both double patenting, and patenting of gene
sequences that have no utility. Under the new requirements a gene sequence or
fragment thereof, must have a specific, real world utility. 58 Under this heightened
standard, raw DNA will not be patentable.

4. Disclosureand Enablement
A patent application must contain a written description of the invention. The
written description should include a description of the manner and process of
making and using the invention, in clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to make and use the invention.5 9 The application must also
include the best mode for carrying out the invention, however, a description of
every conceivable mode is not required. 60 The written description demonstrates
6
that inventor had actual possession of the invention. '
Of the Section 112 requirements, applications are most often rejected for
failure to comply with the enablement requirement. The enablement is required to
ensure that someone of ordinary skill in the art could actually make and use the
invention. 62 The description does not need to provide a step-by-step guide to make
the invention but must allow someone skilled in the art to make and use the
invention without undue experimentation. 63 It is this public disclosure of the
invention, in exchange for the monopoly, that is granted when a patent issues.

57. Id.
58. Julie

Grisham, New Rules for Gene Patents, 18 NATURE

921

(2000),

available at

http://www.nature.com/cgi-taf/DynaPage.taffile=/nrg/joumal/v I8/n9/full/nbt0900_921 .html
(on file with Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
60. Id.
61. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1664, 1171 (1993).

62. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
63. See MPEP, supra note 7, at § 2164.
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5. Non-obviousness
Section 103 of the Patent Act describes the parameters of the nonobviousness requirement. This section precludes the granting of a patent if the
invention is obvious from an individual prior art,64 or from a combination of prior
art to someone skilled in the art.65
In 1996, the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., articulated four
factors to determine non-obviousness.6 6 The four factors include: (1) the scope and
content of the prior art, (2) the difference between the prior art and the claimed
invention, (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) other secondary
considerations.67 Secondary considerations may include commercial success; long
felt but unsolved need; unexpected result; other's failure to solve the same
problem; licensing by others; and recognition by others in the art.68 There must be
a nexus between the secondary considerations and the existing patent in order for
obviousness to be found. 69 Although it was decided several years ago, the Graham
decision remains the guideline in reviewing non-obviousness.

III. GENETICS BASICS
A. Overview of DNA
It is an organisms' DNA that determines its characteristics.
Every
chromosome is a unique individual strand of DNA. A whole copy of an
organism's DNA resides in each individual cell.7 °
DNA is comprised of two
rungs which are connected together, like those of a ladder. 7' The ladder twists
around itself into a spiral, and each rung consists of a sugar, and a phosphate group
which contains a nitrogenous base.72 There are four different nitrogenous bases
that work in complimentary pairs. The nitrogenous bases of each side of the DNA
are matched up with the corresponding complimentary bases on the other side of
the ladder.73 The arrangement of the nitrogenous bases on the DNA strands is
what makes an organism's genetic code distinct. 74 Any mismatch in the

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Prior art is an existing patent or other publication.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
383 U.S. 1(1996).
Id. at 17-18.
Id.
Id.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Olsen, supranote 1, at *297.
Erramouspe, supra note 9, at *980.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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nitrogenous base pairs could possibly lead to an abnormality. The different, small
segments of sequences of nucleic acids make up individual genes and are the units
that make up our inheritance.75

B. Gene Expression
A gene is usually expressed in the form of proteins which control most of the
activities in cells including function, structure and other activity. 76 Three nucleic
acids translate into a single amino acid.77 A sequence of amino acids codes for a
particular protein, and a gene is comprised of a sequence of nucleic acids which
translates into codons (the sequence of three nucleic acids), which in turn translate
into amino acids which finally comprise a protein.78

C. Gene Isolation
There are two distinct methods of gene isolation. 79 The two methods include
copy DNA (cDNA) sequencing and genetic sequencing. 8° The method of cDNA
starts with the premise that a person's exact genetic sequence does not directly
code for a gene that later is translated into a protein. 81 The DNA molecule is first
translated into an RNA (ribonucleic acid) molecule which is later transcribed into a
messenger RNA (mRNA) sequence.82 The mRNA molecule translates into the
83
elements that build the protein, and is a copy of the DNA without the introns.
Reverse transcriptase allows for the translation of mRNA back into DNA.84 When
the DNA molecule is made it does not include the introns that have previously
been spliced out. 85 Gel electrophoresis is then preformed on the DNA sequence,
giving the exact nucleic acid sequence. 6 The disadvantage of this method is that it
does not allow for the sequencing of the introns, so the overall sequence of a

75. Id.; Olsen, supranote 1, at *301.
76. Erramouspe, supra note 9, at *982.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Olsen, supra note 1, at *302.
80. Id.
81. Id. at *303.
82. Id. at *303-04.
83. Id. at *303-04. An intron is a region of DNA that does not code for a protein. These regions
are edited out of the DNA before the protein is made. Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth,
Reinventing The Double Helix: A Novel And Nonobvious Reconceptualization of The Biotechnology
Patent,55 STAN. L REV. 303, *408 (2002) WL 55 STNLR 303 [hereinafter Demaine & Fellmeth].
84. Olsen, supra note I, at *303-04.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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chromosome or gene cannot be determined.87 The exons may provide valuable
88
information about the expression of the genes themselves.
Genetic sequencing is the slower, more traditional method of gene isolation.
First a large genetic fragment is identified.89 Subsequently, the fragment is cut into
smaller sequences using a restriction endonuclease. 90 After the pieces of DNA
have been shortened, they go through gel electrophoresis. 9' The electrophoresis
allows for the nucleic acid sequence to be identified.92 By repeating this process
and comparing the results, researchers are able to determine the genomic DNA
93
sequence.

IV. WHY ARE GENES PATENTABLE?

A. Are the Statutory Requirements Met?
Gene patents must satisfy all of the statutory requirements that all other
patent applications must fulfill, including patentable subject matter, novelty, utility,
enablement and disclosure, and non-obviousness. 94 A common assumption is that
genes are not patentable because they are naturally occurring. But the Supreme
Court has held that purified forms of naturally occurring substances are in fact
patentable. 95 The USPTO will grant a patent for a purified and isolated gene that
demonstrates new utility and was not previously known, discovered or suggested.96
The Court has reasoned that the purified forms do not naturally exist and that
human ingenuity is required to actually purify and identify the sequence.97

B. Evolution of the Case Law Leading to the Patentingof Genes
At the inception of the patent system, the first court decisions regarding
patents were decided by the federal district courts. Beginning in 1982, Congress
created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in order to address the

87. Id.
88. Id. An exon is a region of DNA that does code for a protein. See also Demaine & Fellmeth,
supranote 83, at *408.
89. Olsen, supra note 1, at *302-03.
90. Id. at *303.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-3, 112 (2000).
95. See generally,Diamond,supra note 41.
96. See generally, Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
97. See generally,Fiers, supra note 61.
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complex subject of patenting. 98 One reason behind the creation of the Federal
Circuit is to ensure consistency of the holdings in patent cases. 99 Over the years it
is evident that both the Circuit decisions, as well as those from the Supreme Court,
progressively opened the door to the patenting of biological material.
In 1948, the Supreme Court in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
Co.'0° held that the combination of several species of existing bacteria was not
patentable because all the elements of the invention were known and exist in
nature.' 0 1 The mere fact the applicant combined products of nature does not render
the combination a "patentable" invention because the individual components of the
invention are naturally occurring. ° 2 As such the Court distinguished between the
discovery of a patentable sequence, and the newly discovered natural principle
resulting from combining products of nature.'° 3
The next influential case in the area of gene patenting was decided by the
Fourth Circuit in 1958. In Merk & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 104 the
court allowed for a purified vitamin to be patented. 0 5 One of the considerations
that the court took into account was that the vitamin as found in nature had no
utility. 10 6 The governing statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101, does not specify that a product
of nature that is transformed to a new and useful composition cannot be
patented. 0 7 Here, because an element of an invention occurs in nature, it was not
interpreted to mean that the whole invention was not patentable. 0 8 There was also
nothing in the prior art to suggest, or from which to anticipate, the vitamin. 0 9
The next decision from the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the patentability of
genes came 22 years later in Diamond v. Chakrabarty."° In a 5-4 decision, the
Court held that living organisms can be patented.'
The issue before the Court
was whether or not a micro-bacteria that was not present in nature, was capable of
being patented." 2 The Court determined that a patent could be granted because the
organisms at issue did not naturally occur in nature, a decision that paved the way

98. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
99. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit- A Reminiscence, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 513,
*525 (1992) WL 14 GMULR 513.
100. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
101. Id. at 132.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 253 F.2d 156 (1958).
105. Id. at 164.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 162.
109. Id. at 164.
110. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
111. Id. at 318.
112. Id. at 305.
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for gene patents. The Court determined that 35 U.S.C. § 101 has traditionally be
interpreted very broadly, and thus the Court should continue to do so. 1 3 It is the
broad interpretation that allowed for the patent to issue.' 14 The Court struggled
with whether bacteria should fall within § 101, yet referenced congressional
reports which indicated that it fit within the statutory definition in § 101, given that
the bacteria could not be reproduced in nature."15
Several years later, in 1991, there was another evolution in the patenting of
genes-this time at the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical,"6 the court allowed a patent to issue for
the genetic sequence of a blood protein. 117 The application was found to be
enabling by the disclosure of the full DNA sequence of the blood protein.' i8 But
the court failed to consider the obviousness of the protein itself." 9 This same
There, the court
court, in 1993, took a different approach in In re Bell. 120
considered whether a prior art that disclosed an amino acid sequence of a protein
would make the DNA sequence of that protein obvious. 121 Although a protein
sequence makes the process for finding a corresponding gene easier by allowing
the researcher to hypothesize possible sequences, in this case it produced 1,036
different nucleotide sequences.122 Bell did not claim all of these possibilities,
which may have been found to be obvious, but instead claimed only one sequence
which coded for a particular gene. 23 The court found that when the protein
sequence is known, the DNA sequence may be found to124be obvious depending on
whether the amino acids are specified by unique codons.
125
More recently, the Federal Circuit in its 1993 decision in Fiers v. Revel
stressed the importance of disclosure of the gene sequence on a patent application.
This case was an interference proceeding, in which the court specified the priority
date of the Fiers application and then looked at a foreign filed application to
determine if it met the statutory requirements. 26 The court determined that it did
27
not meet the statutory requirement because the application was not enabling.'

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 316-17.
Id.
Id. at 313 (citing to H.R. 1129, and S.Res. 315).
927 F.2d 1200(1991).
See generally id.

118. Id.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
991 F.2d 781 (1993).
Id. at 783.
Id. at 784.
Id.
Id.
984 F.2d 1164 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 1170-71.
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Although the application was for a gene patent, it did not specify the gene
sequence itself.128 The court determined that an application must specify more
than just the functional utility of the gene to be patentable. 129 In short, the DNA
sequence itself must be disclosed.

C. Considerationfor the Patentingof Genes
With the feasibility of gene patenting recognized by both the Supreme
Court, and at the circuit level as discussed above, we turn from a discussion of the
legal possibility of gene patenting, to a consideration of the practical implications
of granting patents in this area.
1. Arguments for the Patentingof Genes
a. The Medical Infringement Exception
30
One of the overarching goals of the patent system is to drive discovery.'
The reward theory incentivizes researchers to determine the sequences for genes in
order to secure a patent, disclosure of which may lead to the development of new
medical treatments. The combination of the incentive to invent and the sharing of
information promotes necessary medical progress. 131 In 1996, Congress adapted
the Patent Act to allow for the infringement of medical process patents. 32 This
adaptation fosters medical treatments despite infringement, and continues to
encourage innovation. This medical treatment infringement exception is a one-ofa-kind and the patented process cannot be used in any other manner. The policy
behind this 1996 congressional adaptation is to continue the encouragement of
invention, but at the same time it ensures that the public is not deprived of the
newest medical treatments, and achieves the necessary balance between protecting
both public and private interests. 133

b. Commercialization:A Necessary Evil
Many of the companies searching for gene sequences depend on the
commercialization of the patent in order to survive financially.' 34 There is no race
to improve a gene patent because the gene is already fully purified and disclosed.

128. Id. at 1171.
129. Id. at 1169.
130. Bradshaw, supra note 4, at *645.
131. Robin E. Margolis, PatentingHuman Genes: Sheer Lunacy or Sound Legal Protection?,9 NO.
10 HEATHSPAN 14, *15 (1992) WL 9 No. 10 HTHSP 14.
132. Minwalla, supra note 50, at *488.
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Many companies would not be able to research and develop new technology
without the profits that they receive from licensing their patents; in that sense
135
unfair advantages or excessive profits are the price of continued progress.
Genetic research is inherently expensive, and without the possible reward of the
limited monopoly, it would be close to impossible to solicit funding. Many of the
companies may borrow money in order to carry out the research and cannot
survive without the revenue generated from licensing their patent. It is also
unlikely that there would be such a rush to find the possible cures to genetically
created health problems without the reward received.

2. ConsiderationsAgainst PatentingGenes
a. Double Patenting
One of the greatest fears weighing against the patenting of genes is that
double patenting of gene sequences will occur, especially given the patenting of
gene segments. 136 Thousands of applications for genes and gene fragments
applications have been filed, and the USPTO has found itself overwhelmed by
these applications and mounting demand. 137 This, in turn, may lead to an increase
in the likelihood of double patenting because of the rush to process these
applications quickly. 38 Due to conflicting rights granted by overlapping patents,
the costs of obtaining a license to use the patented sequence could be driven up by
having to acquire multiple licenses. 139 This could lead to the curtailing of research
40
and possible medical treatments. 1
Another argument against the patenting of genes is that it encourages
duplicative efforts. 141 Due to the desire of different companies and the government
to obtain gene patents, many companies are trying to discover the same gene
sequences. 142 But some companies that cannot afford the effort will not be able to

135. Id. at *322.
136. Id. at *322-23. The fear with patenting gene sequences is that when a later applicant wants to
patent the entire gene they will not be able to, or in the alternative, several people will have a patent for
the same sequence which is clearly against the novelty requirement of 35 U.S.C. (2000). Id. Yet another
option is that they will have to receive a license from the prior patent holder to use their own patent. ld.
Although the original purpose of the Human Genome Project was for a collaborative effort to be
undertaken, the desire of individual companies to acquire as many patents as possible may stop the
collaboration in its tracks. Id. The free flow of information will also be jeopardized, thereby hindering
the quick advancement of technology. The duplicative efforts of researchers also may increase. Id.
137. John Murray, Owning Genes: Disputes Involving DNA Sequence Patents, 75 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 231, *231 (1999) WL 75 CHIKLR 231; see also Olsen, supra note 1, at *326.
138. Olsen, supra note 1, at *326.
139. Id. at *323.
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compete due to the costs of the research that is driven up through the "race" to
patent the human genome.' 43 This will ultimately lead to only a few companies
having all the gene patents and this will lead to the exploitation of gene sequences.
b. Health Concerns
Additionally, health related concerns weigh against gene patenting. It has
been shown that many laboratories may test for a particular gene abnormality
while the patent is pending or not yet patented. 44 Once the patent issues, the labs
that once conducted the tests for reasonable prices will find themselves embroiled
in licensing fees, which they will either be unwilling to pay, or will pay despite
exorbitant costs that will have to be absorbed elsewhere. Many patients, therefore,
may be forced to pay the costs passed onto them, or seek less effective, less
reliable, or perhaps unconventional methods of treatment. The exclusive right
granted by the monopoly can also "impede" research because it makes it difficult
for other companies/institutions who want to find a new treatment to use the
patented gene in research. This limits research on patented genes to only those
companies that have licensed the patent from the inventor, his assignee, or to the
45
inventor himself. 1

c. Statutory Concerns
One of the strongest arguments against the patenting of genes is that it
violates the statutory requirements set forth in the Patent Act. Some have asserted
that even though gene patents are issued on a purified gene, the gene is the same as
the naturally occurring sequence. 146 Some bolster this argument by suggesting that
gene patents should be statutorily barred due to the fact that they occur in nature,
and that natural form is prior art. 1 47 Another such argument is that genes contain
information, and as such the patenting of useful information is a departure from the
patent rules. 48 Under these arguments the patenting of genes would be
impermissible.
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d.Moral Standards
Finally, there are weighty moral arguments against gene patenting. 149 Each
person has his or her own property rights to his or her genes; but a gene patent is
essentially patenting the chromosomes of an individual's cells. 50 A person may
violate a patent when he/she donates their DNA, and yet research is reliant on
individuals' willingness to donate. 151 Individuals who donate their DNA as
samples do not receive any direct benefit from doing so. 5 2 Some argue that the
patenting of DNA is commoditization of human beings and therefore violates
fundamental morality because "human beings should not be used simply as a
means to one's own ends."'' 53 There are also arguments that the genome shapes the
person and thus the patenting of DNA violates a person's dignity. 154 In Moore v.

Regents of the University of California,155 a university developed a cell line from
the patient's cancer cells which was very profitable. 56 This type of exploitation is
precisely the type that opponents to DNA patenting are worried about. Erosion of
respect for human life and the exploitation of human beings are major moral
57

concerns. 1

V. ANALYSIS

At first blush, the benefits of gene patenting-such as the necessary funding
gained from commercialization that provides funding for ongoing developments,
and the infringement exception for medical treatments-appear outweighed by
possible negative impacts ranging from health and moral concerns to duplicative
efforts. Yet of all considerations, the central question must be whether an
appropriate balance is struck between public and private interest in the current
patent system, specifically as it applies to genomic material.
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Id.
Id.at *254-55.
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An important consideration is whether the appropriate balance between the
publics' interest and private patent holder's interest is supported by the current
patent system regarding the patenting of genomic material. The public's interest is
in securing new medicines and treatments.' 58 It is important to remember that the
159
patent system was initially designed to promote inventions not investments.
There are many different considerations that must be weighed by the legislature in
order to make sure that the health and safety of the country does not suffer due to
the restrictions that are caused by the granting of patents on DNA or uses for it.
The legislatures should consider compulsory licensing, which would require
patent owners to license their patents to everyone. The government could regulate
the process so that a "reasonable" licensing fee is paid by the licensee. 160 Although
compulsory licensing will not overcome all of the opposition to genomic patents, it
could help address many of the problems that are keeping useful medical treatment
away from the public, while continuing to promote more research and
development.
First, the fear of double patenting and the ensuing problems can be
overcome by compulsory licensing. The nature of compulsory licensing enables
anyone to receive a license on a patent and thereby use an invention. Because
reasonable royalties can be set by the government, even if a company must obtain
multiple licenses to guard against double patenting, they will not be forced to pay
exorbitant royalty rates which may lead them to abandon using the technology.
Although this is perhaps not the ideal way to overcome the USPTO's failure to
ensure that an invention is not patented twice, it would alleviate many of the
economic hardships associated with double patenting.
Secondly, the cost of regulation and the increased availability of desired
technology if compulsory licensing is implemented, will likely mute many health
concerns. Compulsory licensing would allow for companies to do research and
development on technology to which they may otherwise not have access due to
either the cost of obtaining a license or the patent owner's unwillingness to license.
Many newly developed treatments also would be made available to patients more
quickly and at a much lower cost. It is these treatments that otherwise might be
abandoned, for less reliable, less efficient or more unconventional treatments. It is
evident that compulsory licensing would possibly lead to more treatments in the
future and increase the availability of better treatments to the public.

158. Sandy M. Thomas et al., Shares in The Human Genome-The Future of PatentingDNA, 20
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The statutory concerns discussed above are outweighed by the fact that the
incentive to invent is necessary to promote science. As previously mentioned,
without the incentive to invent, U.S. innovation would not prove as fruitful and it
would not come as quickly. Thus, vital public access to medical treatments would
likely be delayed by several years. Compulsory licensing is an avenue that may
help alleviate delays, and yet will not circumvent the requisite statutory hurdles to
gene patenting.
In order for a patent to issue, all of the statutory requirements must have been
met. The USPTO has not relaxed any of its standards for genomic patents. The
real hurdle against gene patenting, when considering the statutory requirements, is
qualifying as patentable subject matter because naturally occurring items are not
patentable. The courts and the USPTO have held that genes and other biological
material as found in nature are not in fact patentable. Conversely a purified form,
which does not exist in nature, is patentable. The novelty, utility, disclosure and
enablement requirements work the same for any invention-be it a gene or
otherwise-and genes can just as easily be expected to meet these requirements as
any other invention. Furthermore, purified genes are obvious and thus
distinguishable from genes as they occur in nature.
Therefore, if one considers the requirements for non-obviousness set forth by
the Court in Graham, it is clear that all of the factors are fulfilled by gene patents.
The first two factors to consider are the scope and content of the prior art and the
difference between the prior art and the claimed invention.16' Genes as they occur
in nature are within the body and their sequence is unknown. In contrast,
sequences to be patented have been extracted, purified and have undergone
sequencing. The sequence sought to be patented is not naturally occurring.
The third consideration is the level of ordinary skill in the art. 16 2 The great
race to be the first to purify a gene sequence has filled the vacuum of the race to
discover the entire genomic sequence. It is evident that although some of the
processes to discover and sequence genes may have become routine, new
processes are being developed during the race to sequence. The race to sequence is
evidence that this information is still unknown and is not obvious in light of any
prior art.
Secondary considerations include: commercial success, long felt but
unresolved need, unexpected results, others' failure to solve the same problem,
licensing by others, and recognition by others in the art. These must be considered
on a case-by-case basis, but many will be fulfilled by the uses that purified gene
sequences provide and the need for the development of new medical treatments.
The USPTO's insistence that the same statutory requirements that must be met for

161. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
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a patent to issue for any other invention, must be met for a patent to issue on a gene
sequence, should therefore quell objections regarding the statutory requirements.
Finally, compulsory licensing is unlikely to satisfy the breadth of moral
concerns and will only partially alleviate some of the particular moral concerns
surrounding gene patenting. However, this forced licensing will ensure that
exploitive commodization of DNA and gene sequences does not occur because
access will be available to the general public.
Although pronounced moral concerns no doubt stem from sincere
convictions, arguments concerning the potential "harm" resulting from the
patenting of genes may be made on a faulty foundation. 163 Moreover, for many
years the U.S. has permitted the patenting of the different molecules that occur in
the human body; there have been few moral objections to these patents and
publicized fears of abuse have not come to pass. 164 In other words, just as we
allow marketing of other properties of the human body, genes and gene sequences
may be treated as complete commodities without treating the whole human body as
such.
Furthermore, although it may be of little comfort to those whose moral
objections to gene patenting are rooted in religious or deeply philosophical beliefs,
it is important to note that the USPTO's treatment of DNA as a chemical
compound, is similar to its treatment of any other chemical invention, and is not a
marked departure from previous patent practices, nor was it entirely
unpredictable. 65 One could argue that DNA patents are akin to property rights in
other markets,' 66 and yet their commodization is vastly more important precisely
because of the moral implications of restricting access to gene patents. One of the
biggest benefits received from donating one's DNA to research is the possible
medical advances that may be developed as a result of the donation. Because
compulsory licensing can guard against future abuses, carefully limiting access to
gene sequences is arguably less morally objectionable than preventing the
patenting of genes altogether.

163. See Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 83, at *455. The authors identify a conceptual problem
with the idea that the patent system is designed to redress "harm," what they characterize as an
equitable concept. Id. They note that key prohibitions in the patent act are legal requirements, and "do
not stem from a concern for fairness to Mother Nature," but instead are intended to "prevent applicants
from taking something out of the public sphere that the applicants did not themselves create in any
meaningful sense." Id.
164. Resnik, supra note 8, at *158 (pointing out that in the United States, a person's body, voice,
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VI. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated above, compulsory licensing will help overcome many of
the objections against the patenting of genes including those of double patenting,
health concerns and even to a more limited degree, some of the moral objections.
The USPTO and the courts have repeatedly held that genes are patentable provided
that the necessary statutory requirements are met. The benefits received from gene
patenting, including the incentive to invent and the disclosure of new sequences,
outweigh the considerations against gene patenting. Compulsory licensing could
prove to be a valuable tool in the federal legislature's arsenal as it strives to strike a
balance between public and private interests, and to reinforce a patent system that
is now called upon to protect both innovation and investments.

